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WAR PLANNING
AT THE WAR COLLEGE
IN THE MID-1930s
HENRY G . GOLE
O 1984 Henry G. Cole

I

n the decades before the United States
entered the Second World War, the
country was deeply concerned with
domestic issues and inclined to rely upon
geography and disarmament agreements to
insure its national security. A policy of
avoiding conflict was manifest in the size of
the Army maintained by the United States
between the world wars. The active duty
strength of the US Army reached its low point
of 131,959 in 1923. In the decade from 1925
to 1935, Army strength ranged from about
134,000 to 138,000.1 Events in the Far East
and in Europe in the late 1930s, however,
caused the American Commander-in-Chief to
focus his attention on long-ignored military
preparedness as direct or indirect American
involvement in war became a distinct
possibility.
On 28 January 1938 President Franklin
D. Roosevelt informed the Congress, "Our
national defense is inadequate for purposes
of national security and requires increase."2
Almost a year later the entire General Staff
concurred in a War Plans Division study
reporting that the United States had not a
single complete division, while Germany had
90 and Italy 45; Japan had 50 actively employed on the China mainland alone.3 Despite
an increase to 166,000 men in 1936 and to
178,000 in 1937, when the President spoke in

1938 the United States was a third-rate
military power.4 Russell Weigley has described our interwar Army as a small school
for soldiers and repeated General Peyton C.
March's observation that the United States
voluntarily rendered itself more impotent
than Germany under the military restrictions
But, he might
of the Treaty of Ver~ailles.~
have added, that small school for soldiers did
its planning well in the modest circumstances
imposed upon it between the wars.
Even as events in the Far East, Africa,
and Europe provided evidence of international instability in the form of Japanese
and Italian aggression and German revisionism that became aggression, there was a
generalized hope in the United States that
somehow we could stay out of harm's way.
While it can be argued, as Charles Beard did,
that our undeclared war in the Atlantic would
have resulted ultimately in a formal state of
war between the United States and Germany,
it was the Japanese bombs that fell on Pearl
Harbor that drew the United States into the
shooting war. In rapid succession the United
States declared war on Japan, and Germany
declared war on the United States.
Well before US entry into the war, the
basic strategy of the United States in the event
of a two-ocean war was to defeat Germany
first before turning to the task of defeating
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Japan. It is the background of this basic
strategy that concerns us here. More particularly, an initial examination of US
military planning a t the Army War College
during the 1930s suggests a gradual evolution
in strategy rather than an abrupt switch from
plan ORANGE-the plan that considered
war between the United States and Japan,
both without allies- to the RAINBOW plans
that envisioned the United States as a member
of a n alliance a t war with a coalition. More
work needs to be done at both the Military
History Institute and a t the National Archives fully to document this contention. This
article is but the beginning of a modest
revision of a generally held thesis.
Mainstream historical interpretation
emphasizes a precipitous change as the
United States turned from the Pacific to a
"Germany first" strategy between 1938 and
1941. That interpretation overlooks documentation of sound earlier planning that
influenced key Army and Navy officers who
were instrumental in the 1938-41 shift in
strategy. Sufficient unpublished evidence
suggests that while events in the late 1930s
resulted in a shift in strategy in which Germany was identified as the chief foe, the roots
of that shift can be traced to planning begun
in the mid-1930s. The quiet planning by the
small school of soldiers had to await events
before it became visible, but classroom
exercises became Allied World War
strategy.
Writing in 1953, Maurice Matloff gave
full credit to the harried military planners of
1939-41 who raced against the clock to
prepare the militarily weak United States for
a war that by then seemed probable, but in so
doing he underestimated the importance of
solid and useful work that had been accomplished by earlier planner^.^ War
planners at the US Army War College
prepared the groundwork for the great
strategic decisions of 1939-41 at least as early
as 1934. These student planners enjoyed a
close and direct working relationship with the
War Plans Division of the War Department
General Staff. In effect the connection
between the college and the War Plans
Division was so close that the college was

virtually a planning agency of the War
Department.
In fairness to Matloff, who did pioneer
work soon after the events he described, he
also said: "The full story must be sought in
the archives of the Service, Inter-Service, and
British-American staff agencies, which are
still in the very early stages of being mined by
professional scholars."7 He was rigbLB
Referring to the color plans of the 1920s
and 1930s, Matloff said:
A characteristic of all these plans was their
limited scope. Nothing in the way of a global
or total war was envisaged. With the exceptions of ORANGE (signifying Japan),
they bore little relation to contemporary
developments in international affairs.
Central in all was the concept-in accord
with United States national policy-of the
defense of the Continental United States and
its interests by the United States alone
against any foreign threat.*
Describing the frenetic activities of US
military planners as war seemed inevitable, he
continued:
But during 1939-1941 the character of war
planning underwent a change from the color
plan period. They went considerably beyond
the earlier abstract exercises. That change
stemmed from the trend in strategic thinking
which began in the fall of 1938 when the
military and civilian leaders of the United
States first began to work on the assumption
that American security might be jeopardized
by Axis aggression. At that time the
American military staff began to extend the
scope of war planning to take into account
not only the rising danger of war with Japan
but also the reassertion of German imperialist aims. The trend of events abroad
obliged, and the President's concern
licensed, the military planners to study the
possible effect on American security of
action resulting from concerted aggression
by Germany and Italy, in conjunction with
action by Japan. As a result of the exchange
of ideas in May and June, 1939, between the
Army and the Navy, the Joint Board, the

highest inter-Service agency, authorized the
preparation of five new basic war plans.
Unlike the earlier color plans, each
providing for operations against one or
another single power, the five new plans
envisaged the probability of war against
more than one enemy and in more than one
theater. Hence the new plans received appropriate code names of Rainbows No. 1, 2,
3,4, and 5.
The Rainbow plans represented an important step in the efforts of the planners to
reestablish contact with reality in their war
plans. They were the first joint plans which
envisaged a possible global war.10
One takes no exception to Matloff's
conclusion: "The principle that the first aim
had to he the defeat of Germany-perhaps
the single most important controlling
decision in all British-American war policies
in World War 11-thus emerged [from the
American Rainbow 5 and ABC 1]."11 He is
right about the decision, but he is wrong
about earlier planning. As archives at the US
Army War College now being "mined"
reveal, planning from 1934 to 1937 was not of
"limited scope"; did envisage global or total
war; bore more than "little relation to
contemporary developments in international
affairs"; was concerned with more than
defense of the continental United States;
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foresaw the US fighting "more than one
enemy in more than one theater" as part of a
coalition; involved US Navy and Marine
Corps officers, thus making them joint plans;
was in contact with reality; took simultaneous war with Germany and Japan into
account; and recognized a threat in the
German-Japanese-Italian Axis.
Matloff's characterization of pre-1934
military plans as abstract exercises lacking
contact with reality may be accurate, but
planning at the Army War College after 1934
reflects a keen awareness of contemporary
international developments. Matloff's early
incomplete interpretation, however, is pervasive and durable. 12
USAWC PLANNING
AND THE GENERAL STAFF

Planning at the War College was important to the War Department General
Staff, especially to the War Plans Division.
in his Annual Report of the Secretary of
War, 1899, Elihu Root proposed the establishment of a n Army War College that
would, among other things, devise plans. He
also proposed the establishment of a General
Staff. T o create a General Staff required
congressional action, however, so while Root
could and did create the War College by
executive action, he was powerless to legislate
a General Staff. Even before the formal
creation of the General Staff, however, Root
was using the War College Board as a
General Staff. 13 The Army War College
quickly proved its usefulness t o the Army. It
wasn't long before Generals Hugh L. Scott,
then Chief of Staff of the Army, and John
Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, praised graduates
both for their preparation for war and for
their conduct of war. 14
During the interwar period at least two
recurring issues arose and were variously
addressed by succeeding commandants. One
issue was whether students and faculty should
give their attention t o the great problems of
national defense or to the narrower problem
of military science, to strategy or operations.
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The other issue was the college's involvement
with the General Staff, especially the War
Plans Division, and the degree to which a
coherent and autonomous curriculum should
be followed at the college without General
Staff meddling. Neither issue was resolved.
Successive commandants decided those issues
as their preference and experience dictated. ''
During the tenure of Commandant Hanson
Ely (July 1923 to November 1927) a ten-week
long "War Plans Period" dominated the
curriculum, with Plans ORANGE, RED, and
GREEN receiving prominence. Ties between
the Army and Navy War Colleges were firmly
established to facilitate joint planning.I6
Major General William D. Connor, later
Superintendent at West Point, was Commandant from November 1927 to April 1932,
a period characterized by an international
crusade to outlaw war.17 Isolationism
prevailed as the nation rejected great military
adventures, and the Army concerned itself
chiefly with North American defense.
In 1932, George S. Simonds assumed
command of the War College. He came to the
college directly from his position as Chief of
the War Plans Division, established a War
Plans Division at the college, and introduced
a course in coalition warfare. During his
tenure the 1935 and 1936 plans concerned
with simultaneous war with Germany and
Japan were developed. When he left the War
College in 1935, Simonds became Deputy
Chief of Staff to Douglas MacArthur. His
successor, Malin Craig, was Commandant of
the college for less than a year before he
replaced MacArthur as Chief of Staff of the
Army. While Commandant, Craig introduced "Current Events" and later
"Foreign News" under the G-2 Division of
the college in order to insure that war
planning would be realistic. The class was
organized into five work groups, and each
group closely followed developments in an
assigned list of nations. Students were
directed to ask how the policies of the specific
nations affected the United state^.'^ It is
significant that commandants came from
influential positions and went to key staff
appointments as they left the War College.19

The nexus between the college and the War
Department was direct and constant.
Students were required to be keenly
aware of developments around the world and
to incorporate reality rather than abstractions
into their war plans. One notes an increase in
detailed map studies of the Canal Zone,
Panama, and the Philippine Islands under
Simonds, and in 1936 Alaska received
renewed interest in plans as the defensive
Alaska-Hawaii-Panama strategic triangle was
stressed, reflecting widespread realization
that the Philippines could not be successfully
defended.'Vn 1938 Brazil and Argentina
received attention. "Reflecting State Department concern that Hitler or Mussolini might
attempt to exploit the situation of ethnic
groups in South America, as Hitler had that
of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia,
Deputy Chief of Staff George C. Marshall
directed the War College to determine the
force required to protect Brazil from German
and Italian machinations."21 Within ten
weeks a special War College committee
produced a plan for a rapidly deployable
Hemispheric Defense Force of 112,000
submitted at the end of March 1939.22
On 17 June 1940, one-third of the Class
of 1940 received orders for duty on the War
Department General Staff.23The remainder
of the class was divided into five sections to
conduct studies for the corresponding five
sections of the General Staff (G-1, G-2, G-3,
G-4, and the War Plans Division). In a letter
from the Adjutant General dated 11 June
1940, the War Department announced that
the Army War College course for 1940-41
was suspended, an announcement repeated
throughout the war years.24 The college,
along with many other American peacetime
activities, was closed for the duration.
Mobilization from fewer than 200,000
soldiers before the war to more than eight
million in 1945 required a professional core
to organize, train, deploy, equip, and employ
the vastly expanded US Army. Those who
would have been students in earlier years
were a part of that professional core. The
college, an unaffordable luxury, would
reopen when peace returned. Rather than

preparing for war, would-be students would
conduct war.
Archival evidence shows that the connection between the War College and the
"real world" was regular and intimate, not
abstract. Each year the Chief of the War
Plans Division lectured at the college,
outlining the mission, tasks, and organization
of that division of the General Staff. The
actual process involved in developing plans in
the War Plans Division was carefully explained before the students turned to their
assigned plans. Plans on file at the Military
History Institute illustrate shifts in emphasis
from year to year as students addressed issues
important to the General Staff. In addition to
war planning developed by groups of student
officers, individual student studies responded
to General Staff requirements. The college
routinely requested a list of topics to be
addressed by students, and the War Plans
Division provided the list. The topics were
assigned, completed, and at least in some
cases, graded, as an officer of War Plans
Division would comment in a short paragraph concluding with a grade of unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good, very good,
or excellent.25 Sometimes a letter would be
sent to a member of the class notifying him
that his individual study was to be used by the
The close working relaWar De~artment.'~
tionship between the War College and the
General Staff is clearly shown by the tasking
of War College students and faculty to do
studies and devise plans. Further, the
sequence of assignments of commandants
from the General Staff, especially from the
War Plans Division, to the college and back
to the very top positions in the Army put the
Army War College in the mainstream of
Army concerns in the 1930s. Finally, the
students were prepared for General Staff
work and, at the end of the course, either
were recommended for duty on the General
Staff-some for specific assignments and
some with duties unassigned-or were not
recommended for the General Staff.27 From
the inception of the Army War College to the
outbreak of World War 11, the college and
the General Staff were two manifestations of
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a single idea: Elihu Root's desire to establish
an American "brain of the Army."
PLANNING AT THE USAWC
BEFORE 1938

A War Plan RAINBOW dated 14 May
1927 is on file at the Military History In~titute.'~
Quaint and anachronistic in retrospect, it represents a clear departure from
exclusive concern with ORANGE (Japan),
GREEN (Mexico), RED (Great Britain), and
various BLUE (United States) readiness
plans, the kind of planning that could be
regarded as technical exercises devoid of
political reality. It departs from worst-case
planning-war with Britain or Japan or
both-and from purely local wars with
neighbors. This plan is atypical of pre-1934
plans in that instead of the United States
fighting alone against a foe without allies, the
United States is posed in alliance with the
League of Nations. RAINBOW is the League
of Nations. For political reasons not made
clear in the precis, the military plan called for
the United States to seize Halifax and St.
Johns, Newfoundland. Joint Plan RAINBOW was based on the assumption that the
League was strong enough to enforce the
provisions of its covenant, but the United
States was primarily concerned with hemispheric defense. It is regrettable that the entire
plan was not found in the archives, but the
important fact remains that Joint Plan
RAINBOW debuted in 1927.
More pertinent to our purpose here is a
detailed plan for coalition warfare in the
Pacific and Far East dated March 1934." In
that plan, ORANGE and CARNATION
(Manchukuo) provoke war with PINK
(Russia-note: Russia, not the Soviet Union).
As the situation is developed, PINK is joined
by YELLOW (China), RED (Britain plus
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and all
British dependencies in the Far East minus
India), and BLUE (United States). US and
allied naval and ground forces are organized
for combat, and the plan spells out coordination with allies. Clearly this plan bore
more than little relation to contemporary
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developments in international affairs as longstanding US concerns for ORANGE were
modified to take into account the new
Japanese-dominated status of Manchukuo.
Further, Admiral Bryant of the Office of
Naval Operations brought the US Navy's
perspective to the Army War College students
before they addressed the design of the plan.
A series of lectures and conferences was
conducted to make the planners fully aware
of political and military developments in the
world and in the region. Brigadier General
Charles E. Kilbourne, assistant Chief of Staff
of the War Plans Division, War Department
General Staff, lectured the student planners
on "Relations of the War Plans Division with
other Divisions of the General Staff."3O The
location of the Army War College in
Washington made it convenient for key
Army, Navy, and State Department officials
to instruct and advise the student planners at
the college, and this was done. Thus combined operations (operations with allies) and
joint operations (those involving both the
Army and Navy Departments) against more
than one foe (Japan and Manchukuo) were
planned in 1934. Further, as will be seen,
speakers from universities, the Army and
Navy staffs, and the press insured that
planning was based upon sound understanding of contemporary international
events.
One of the student officers in the War
Plans Course taken by all War College
students was a Captain William Halsey,
USN, a member of the Class of 1934. One
wonders if Admiral Halsey reflected upon the
reality of the planning of 1934 as he steamed
about the Pacific from 1942 to 1945.
The following year a planning group at
the Army War College assessed the contemporary international situation before
drawing a plan, "Subject: Participation with
Allies," dated 17 April 1935." The alliesFrance, Italy, Great Britain, and the United
States-faced an enemy coalition called "the
Nazi Confederation"-Germany, Austria,
Hungary, and Yugoslavia. This 202-page
document, not including maps and overlays,
considers war in two theaters and is clearly
responsive to events of the day.

Voi. XV, No. 1

In presenting the plan to the War College
faculty, the chairman of the planning group
made the following remark: "This situation
was conceived by the Faculty some months
ago and events of today outside the walls of
this institution are in a fair way to snbstantiate the Faculty's flight of fancy to a
degree most flattering to the perspicacity of
that august body."
A review of the highlights of the plan
illustrates a keen awareness of events on the
international scene and military events in step
with political developments.
The situation is developed as follows:
* January 1935: a coup d'etat puts
Austrian Nazis in power; Austria enters into
a political and economic pact with Germany.
Italy, with the approval of France
and Great Britain, seizes the Brenner and
Reschen passes and occupies two Austrian
towns; revolt in Italian Tyrol follows.
* War is declared on 10 January, with
Italy on one side and Austria and Germany
on the other.
Italy sends troops to Albania on 20
January in order to control the Adriatic;
Yugoslavia mobilizes and returns to Hungary
certain of her former territory in consideration for a guaranty of Yugoslavia's
northern border.
Hungary casts her lot with Germany
and Austria and demands territory from
Czechoslovakia.
In the middle of February a revolt in
the Ukraine breaks out, financed by Germany.
At the end of February, a Nazi
Confederation is formed consisting of
Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia is promised Albania and
Fiume.
France joins Italy.
Czechoslovakia is overrun by Hungarian troops; France holds the west bank of
the Rhine. The French advance is limited to
the Rhine due to the demand of French public
opinion that war be limited. (Emphasis
added.)
* Russia closes her western frontier,
reinforces her Far Eastern army, and engages
in suppression of revolt in the Ukraine.
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Japan has a secret understanding
with Germany and concentrates a large force
in northwest Manchukuo; demands a free
hand in China, cessation of further fortification of Singapore and Hongkong;
notifies the United States that any movement
of the US fleet west of the 180th meridian
(roughly halfway between Hawaii and Wake
Island) would be considered a hostile act;
asserts right of sovereignty over mandated
islands which she was fortifying.
* Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States adopt common
policy in the Pacific and Far East as of 20
March.
* In Europe, Germans conduct unrestricted aerial warfare in February and
March, including chemical warfare against
French and Italian industrial centers and
against shipping in the Mediterranean.
In the United States,
The American people loudly demanded that
the US not enter the conflict no matter what
the cost. Laws were passed withdrawing

protection to nationals or property in the
war zone and mindful of our World War
debts forbidding the making of loans to
belligerents . . . . The people sought for
someone to blame, and Jewish and other
anti-Nazi propaganda already active, seized
on this opportunity to make Germany and
her allies the scape goats [for the loss of
trade with Europe] . . . then came the
Japanese ultimatum denying to our fleet,
movement west of the 180th meridian, which
hurt the pride of Americans and opened
their eyes to the real threat to our economic
interests and indeed to our commercial
future. [Emphasis added.]
On 22 March, Japan closes the Sea of
Japan and the China Sea to all foreign ships
not licensed by the Japanese government.
On 30 March, the United States and
Britain declare a state of armed neutrality in
the Pacific; this action is warmly received by
the US public.
Shortly thereafter, several American
and British ships are destroyed in the ports of
Le Havre and Cherbourg by Nazi aircraft.
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On 10 April, the United States and
Britain declare war on the Nazi Confederation.
Proceeding from this scenario, the
planning group, acting as Chief of Staff of
the Army and President of the Joint (ArmyNavy) Board, prepared memoranda of instructions for the American representative on
the Inter-Allied War Council, for the commander of the expeditionary force to be sent
to the European Theater, and for the commander of the US fleet, referred to by the
planners as "the Mr. House, the General Pershing and the Admiral Mayo of today." The
main decisions of the planning group were:
o

(1) That the United States is committed to the War in Europe but sooner or
later will have to deal with Japan.
(2) Our war aims are to prevent the
Nazi or any other Confederation becoming
supreme in Europe, and Japan becoming all
powerful in the Far East. N will not suffice
that orir assistance be limited to money and
supplies and it has been decided to send an
expeditionary force to Europe for moral

effect and to strengthen our position at the
peace table. Public opinion however, will
support a war with Japan more heartily than
one in Europe; moreover conditions now are
different than when we entered hostilities in
1917 for the Allies already have a sufficient
superiority not only in numbers but in
training and supplies. Hence, all we need
send to France is a respectable force-and
we can save our main effort for Japan . . . .

[Emphasis added.]
(3) As for the Navy, at sea too our
Allies need no help. However, for strategic
and for both national and international
political reasons, it is essential that a strong
naval force be stationed in the Pacific.
The Nazi main objective was assessed as
"that of regaining all territory lost by the
member nations in the World War and of
extending their territory in Europe to the
southeast. This strategic time will probably
be coincident with the entry of Japan into the
war with the objective of neutralizing
American and British effort in Europe."
Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

This 1935 plan is sensitive to French and
American public opinion and its constraining
influence on the respective governments. It
anticipates the "Sitzkrieg" of September
1939 to May 1940, and the reference to the
insufficiency of money and supplies anticipates the vain hope that Lend-Lease would
be enough to defeat the Axis Powers. The
planning document refers to the "hesitation
of the French people to endorse the plan of
their high command to engage in offensive
operations across the Rhine." The planners
were prescient in tracing American attitudes
from antipathy to war to grudging acquiescence in the recognition of risks to
American interests, and perceptive in noting
the preference among the American people to
fight the Japanese rather than Europeans.
The American alliance with Great Britain
also receives attention: "The growing union
with Great Britain, emphasized by the joint
action in the Pacific, has been popular. The
necessity of acting in concert with Great
Britain in both the European and possible
Pacific theaters grew to be generally appreciated."
Both the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and the success of the German
blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940 lay in the
future, so military planning in the spring of
1935 proceeded on the assumption of greater
allied strength than would be the case as the
United States entered the two-theater war. By
the summer of 1940, Germany dominated
West and Middle Europe, and British survival was in doubt. After 22 June 1941, the
survival of the Soviet Union became a big
question mark. Further, the Japanese would
be clearly ascendant in the Far East and
Western Pacific in late 1941. The American
President would be forced to make hard
choices about the priorities for scarce war
materials as America converted to a war
economy. His own total forces, long neglected, would grow from hundreds of thousands
to 13 million in the course of the war. At the
same time, it was necessary to provide
weapons and equipment to Britain and the
Soviet Union in order to sustain those allies in
their war effort. Their crystal ball had flaws,
but the 1935 planning group at the War

College clearly anticipated the two-ocean war
that lay six years in the future.
Variations of the 1935 plan received
attention in succeeding years at the Army
War College, and they continued to reflect
events in Europe, Africa, and the Far East. In
the 1936 war plans we find the GermanItalian-Japanese combination in place as
global war involving the United States
continued to be viewed as a distinct possibility.
As was the case in 1935, thorough
preparation preceded actual planning. Lectures and conferences on the missions and
functions of the General Staff were conducted at the War College, and those of the
War Plans Division were, as usual, highlighted.)? The War Plans Division was proud
to call itself primus inter pares as its
spokesman explained the process-in excruciating detail-from inception of a plan
through approval by the Secretaries of War
and Navy to ultimate filing of the plan. A G-2
(Intelligence) course was conducted to
provide the latest data on the contemporary
international situation to planners. One
report, "Subject:
Strategical SurveyGermany," dated 14 December 1935, concluded: "Germany's rearmament program
should be completed within three to five
years. In a European War beginning prior to
accomplishment of their rearmament effort,
the Reich will endeavor to remain neutral.
Failing this, she will join any coalition that
will insure her expansion to the ~outheast."'~
This US Army estimate of German military
readiness for war came very close to
professional estimates by German planners
who were concerned about Hitler's too-hasty
buildup of forces.
Intense work to develop the student war
plan, "Participation with Allies," took place
at the Army War College from 19 March to
15 April 1936.34Italy, it will be recalled, was
an ally of the United States in the 1935 plan.
In 1936, probably not arbitrarily, Italy was
found in the enemy camp along with Germany, Austria, and Hungary. While no
evidence leaps out of the files, one could
safely assume that the Italian adventure in
Ethiopia and Hitler's moral support of that

enterprise relegated Italy to the enemy camp
in 1936. This time the enemy was called "The
Central Coalition." Allied to the United
States were France, the British Commonwealth, Greece, and Turkey. Poland was
neutral but "favored the enemy coalition."
Again the planners drew Japan into the
global picture. Russia was concerned with
both her western and eastern frontiers.
Russia mobilized "possibly in anticipation of
German, Polish, or Hungarian expansion
into the Ukraine, but definitely to reinforce
Siberia against Japan. Japan, known to have
a defensive alliance with Germany, has
demanded recognition of an exclusive Japanese hegemony in the Far East."35 The United
States declared war on Germany on 5 March
I936 in reaction to attacks by coalition air
forces and submarines on American shipping
on the high seas and in allied ports. Interestingly, the plan has the United States
declaring war on Germany just as-in the
"real world"-German generals are receiving
their marching orders to remilitarize the
Rhineland. This is a coincidence, but it
demonstrates that the War College planners
were keenly aware that developments on the
international stage could involve the United
States in a European or Pacific war or both.
Both the 1935 and 1936 plans connect
German and Japanese aggression as it affects
the United States. The Soviet Union, concerned for its western frontier, seems even
more absorbed in Japanese activities on the
Soviet eastern frontier and in national
movements within the Soviet Union. The
United States, recalling the unrestricted
submarine warfare conducted by Germany
that most directly brought her into World
War I, also looks ahead to the undeclared
naval war in the Atlantic before the attack on
Pearl Harbor resulted in declared war. The
considerable attention to aerial warfare in
both plans also links them to reality, making
them more than "abstract exercises."
PROFESSOR LANGER'S LECTURES

Basing their estimates of the interriatior~alsituation on their own strategical
survey of Germany and Europe, the 1935

Army planners came much closer to the mark
than a distinguished Harvard historian did
some three years later. On 6 January 1938,
Professor William L. Langer addressed the
Army War College. His theme was "The
German S i t ~ a t i o n . " ' ~Langer began by calling My Struggle, Hitler's Mein Karnpf, "that
rather silly book"! He went on to say "I
don't believe we can use that text as a starting
point for a discussion of German policy." In
a remarkable series of pronouncements,
Langer was so consistently wrong that
historians are well advised to note the danger
in investing their professional reputations in
predicting the future. Here is Langer on
Russia and Germany:
Let tne say at this point, in the first place,
that the Ukraine is a long way from Germany, that it would be most difficult for the
Germans to get there, and it would be even
more difficult for the Germans to stay there,
if they once got there. I myself can put no
stock whatever into these yarns about
Germany's intentions of taking the Ukraine
from Russia and 1 am impressed with the
fact that between Germany and Russia lies
Poland, a broad, substantial country as you
can see on the map, with a pretty considerable population and a reasonably
formidable army, I should say . . . as long
as Poland remains reasonably strong, it
seems to me that Poland will be a very effective barrier against any German attempt
to advance into southern Russia.
Perhaps I am losing too much time over this
subject. 1 don't take it seriously, as 1 say, the
whole business between Germany and Russia
is a very obscure one.
Langer also presented a case for historic
German-Russian friendship; he elaborated on
binding treaties dating from 1922, 1926, and
1933 and highlighted shared economic interests. H e concluded this portion of his
lecture by saying: "As a practical proposition, I think neither of those two countries
has any idea of aggression on the other, and I
am therefore skeptical about any serious
development in that direction."
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He was equally skeptical regarding
Czechoslovakia: "Here again I must express
some skepticism with regard t o Germany's
aggressive purposes in this area . .
I don't
believe in any German attempt t o conquer
Czechoslovakia." And further: "I don't
imagine anybody is expecting a clash between
Germany and France in the near future
1 don't think that that is a very urgent matter
a t the present time."
He concluded his analysis:

..

. .. .

It is quite conceivable after all that they
[Germans and French] may not strike
anywhere. 1 have been told by people in an
excellent position to know, among others by
the Secretary of the German Embassy here in
Washington, who was for years a personal
aide of Hiller, that Hitler, of all people, is so
tremendously impressed by his war experiences, which he talks about all the time,
that the one uppermost thought in his mind
is the desire to spare the German people an
ordeal of that sort in the future. And when
all is said and done, it is now five years since
Hitler came into power. During that time we
have been promised a German attack from
week to week, you might say, and it hasn't
come yet. I am at least willing to reserve
judgement and see what happens in the
future. In the interim, I think it would be
well for all of us to be circumspect and
reserve judgement.
Professor Langer forgot that a diplomat
is a gentleman sent abroad to lie for his
country!
One would like t o report that during the
question-and-answer period following his
lecture, Professor Langer staged a miraculous recovery a n d was brilliant. Unfortunately it got worse.
Question: (Lieutenant Colonel del Valle) To
what do you ascribe our great misinformation and misconception in this country
of the actual German situation? That is to
say, all one hears is hostility for Hitler and
for Germany, and then what you have
shown us to be their ultimate ambitions?

Answer: I think there are two reasons. In the
first place, the Germans with all their
tremendous endowment are terribly dumb, it
seems to me, when it comes to dealing with
the psychology of other peoples. They
showed themselves almost heroic in that
regard before the [first world] war, and after
all such things as occurred during the warthe Zimmerman note and all that businessseemed to me to demonstrate a complete
incapacity to see the thing as someone else
might see it. That I think is one important
reason. They are pure propagandists; they
are rather elephantine in their efforts to
persuade other peoples. The other reason
is-I see no reason why it should not be
stated here-is I think the Jewish influence
has a great deal to do with it. You have to
face the fact that some of our most important American newspapers are Jewishcontrolled, and 1 suppose if I were a Jew I
would feel about Nazi Germany as most
Jews feel and it would be most inevitable
that the coloring of the news takes on that
tinge. As I read the New York Times, for
example, it is perfectly clear that every little
upset that occurs, (and after all many upsets
occur in a country of 70 million people) is
given a great deal of prominence. The other
part of it is soft-pedalled or put off with a
sneer. So that in a rather subtle way, the
picture you get is that there is no good in the
Germans whatever.
I t is difficult to believe that the Army
W a r College invited Professor Langer back
the following year a n d even more difficult to
believe that he accepted. Perhaps it was the
college's non-attribution policy f o r remarks
made there, or Professor Langer's knowledge
that his audience of the year before, except
for some of the faculty, had departed. In any
event o n 7 January 1939 Langer was hack a t
the War College t o lecture o n " The German
S i t ~ a t i o n . " ~H
' e didn't get it right this time,
either. In his introductory remarks, he said:
I analyzed the German policy as I saw it at
that time, and I find now that I guessed right
on some things and guessed wrong on

others, which is very apt to happen to almost
everyone. Certainly, the last year has been
such that no one could very well foresee it.
In fact, I think you would have a hard time
in finding a parallel to it, except in the career
of thegreat Napoleon.
He continued: "The period of annexation has for the most part come to an
end, and the Germans will content themselves
with their economic domination and with a
very extensive political influence all the way
from Germany to the Black Sea." Further: "I
don't imagine the Germans have even the
vaguest idea of annexing the Ukraine." He
repeated his opinion, enunciated the year
before, regarding German caution in dealing
with Poland. He also generalized about the
Franco-German situation: "In short, I think
there is a possibility of better relationship
between France and Germany than there has
been for a long time, and there certainly is a
considerable body of opinion in France which
favors a closer and friendly relationship." He
seemed to welcome what he called the
"general liquidation," meaning the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. He explained the
French and British positions in that matter by
saying: "Having fought a war for selfdetermination, it was a little difficult t o fight
another one to prevent self-determination."
From these observations flowed his optimistic conclusion:
I don't think that the outlook in Europe is a

very pleasant one. There are so many
questions on the board that almost anything
might lead to a crack-up. On the other hand,
I am not inclined to be as pessimistic as some
people. It seems to me there is always a
possibility of some peaceful achievement
and 1 certainly hope that in the long run
some such arrangement can be devised.
In the question-and-answer period after
his lecture, the polite questions of the military
officers suggested that they were less
sanguine about German aggression than
Professor Langer was. He seemed to be an
apologist for German bad behavior. This is
not to suggest that Langer was pro-Nazi. His

generation of historians generally admired
Germany, and many had studied there. It is
suggested, rather, that one loses objectivity
by being too close to one's subject.
The Langer lectures of 1938 and 1939
were cited at some length less to punish him
than to demonstrate that the military
pragmatists observing what was taking place
in Europe came closer to getting it right than
a man steeped in European history and
culture. Further, the pragmatists had been
getting it right since 1934.
IN CONCLUSION

Sometimes the plausibility of readily
apparent cause seems t o make further inquiry
unnecessary. That the US Army was so
neglected-even ignored-in the 1920s and
1930s is widely known. The feverish activity
and success of US military planners as the
world slid into the war of 1939-45 is also
widely known. Focus has been, not unnaturally, on the herculean efforts of those
who transformed the United States from
third-rate to superpower status between 1938
and 1945. Generally overlooked in the telling
of this story has been the quiet planning that
had been going on at the Army War College
in the mid-1930s. That neglected planning
was the springboard that allowed wartime
planners to launch existing concepts. It would
appear that the soundness of that planning
has not been examined because the interwar
US Army was written off as a small
provincial subculture whose petty concerns
were unworthy of careful examination. It has
been dismissed as being irrelevant, a kind of
backwater, and understandably so when one
considers the drama and vastness of events
from 1939 to 1945 and the years that
followed.
The Army War College did not provide
the War Plans Division of the General Staff
with plans that could be dusted off as war
came t o America. The fact is, however, that
officers attending the War College, especially
from 1934 onward, were conditioned to think
in global terms totally out of proportion to
the contemporary capabilities of the small
services that sent them to reflect on war and
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to plan for it for a year as students. The
majority of these officers were assigned to
key positions on the General Staff when they
completed the course. Interaction between
the General Staff, the Navy, and the State
Department characterized the War College
experience from at least 1932. A succession of
commandants came from important and
influential positions to the college and
frequently moved on to even more important
and influential assignments. The Chief of the
War Plans Division and regional specialists
came to the college each year to set the tone
for planning and to integrate reality into the
course. In brief, the planning was not abstract and out of touch with events on the
world stage. Many graduates of the War
College achieved fame as wartime leaders,I8
but even more of them remained anonymous
as they plied their trade as planners and staff
officers during World War 11, using skills
honed in peacetime at the War College. The
college thus made a major contribution both
to the growth of an Army of fewer than
200,000 scattered about in small garrisons to
an Army of over eight million soldiers, and to
the broadness of vision usually ascribed to
our wartime planners. The modest circumstances of the US Army between the wars
did not prevent planning on the grand scale.
Realistic planning, including the planning for
a two-ocean war, did not await the events of
the late 1930s. It can be traced to at least
1934.
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